UIC Law Review
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 3

Fall 1988

Affirmative Action: A Divided Supreme Court, 22 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 99 (1988)
Arthur J. Marinelli

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons,
Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of
the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Arthur J. Marinelli, Affirmative Action: A Divided Supreme Court, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 99 (1988)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A DIVIDED
SUPREME COURT
ARTHUR

J.

MARINELLI*

"The extent to which the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

. .

permits government to use racial classifica-

tions to remedy prior racial discrimination is one of the most significant and controversial constitutional issues of our time."'
INTRODUCTION

This article will deal with the state of our law in regard to affirmative action2 which contains an element of a preference that is
used to increase, maintain or rearrange an identified group's number
or status. Because of the philosophical debate over the justice of affirmative action and the legal questions left unanswered, it is difficult to avoid creating an impression that the subject rises above the
realm of political passion.' The term affirmative action is equated by
some with the concept of preferential treatment which translates to
goals, timetables or even quotas.4
While affirmative action plans pose danger of improper motivation, they are usually motivated in overcoming historical and contemporary racial discrimination. Opponents of affirmation action
generally argue for a "color-blind" theory of the Constitution and
that this is required by the equal protection clause." The term "Our
Constitution is color blind" comes from the first Justice Harlan's
* Professor of Business Law, Ohio University. B.A., Ohio University; J.D., Ohio
State University College of Law.
1. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionalityof Remedial Racial Classifications:Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IOWA L. REv. 255 (1987).
2. The term seems to have originated in labor relations law. See Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed.
1979) which defines affirmative action programs as "[e]mployment programs required
by federal statutes and regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in
hiring minority group members."
3. Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophicaland
Constitutional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 847 (1985).
4. Karnes, The Legality of Preferential Treatment After Weber, in OFFCP
and FederalContract Compliance 169 (D. Copus & L. Rosenzweig ed. 1981) (Practicing Law Institute).
5. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-ConsciousRemedies, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 213, 220 (1979).
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dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.' The Supreme Court has never held
that racial classifications are unconstitutional per se 7 or that the
Constitution is color-blind. The Court has held, however, that the
state may use racial criteria in districting and apportionment,' and
has acknowledged that implementation of desegregation plans will
normally require assignment of students on account of race.9 The
Court has rejected the argument that the Constitution requires that
teachers be assigned on a "color-blind" basis'0 and has used equitable relief using racial factors to deal with violations of anti-discrimination laws." Racial accountability on the part of both private and
government employers is necessary and this requires them to have
an effective affirmative action plan. Mr. Justice Blackmun once
stated: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not let the equal protection clause perpetrate racial supremacy."1
The Court has failed to reach a consensus about affirmative action programs and has been unable to agree on the constitutional
standards governing affirmative action efforts. While the Justices
have agreed that remedies may extend to persons beyond the actual
victims of discrimination and may place burdens on innocent persons,'" they have not agreed on how great a burden such innocent
persons must bear. The affirmative action cases are as notable for
what they do not say, and illustrate Justice Brandeis' point that
"the most important thing we do is not doing.""'
I do not intend to add to the great volume of analyses about the
consitutional questions and how they should be resolved,"5 but
6. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting). The context of the sentences
preceding this quote seem appropriate:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of consitutional liberty. But in view of
the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is
color-blind.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSITUTIONAL LAW 605 (3d ed. 1986).
8. United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977).
9. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
10. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19 (1971).
11. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
12. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
13. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
14. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71 (1962); Lamber,
Observations on the Supreme Court's Recent Affirmative Action Cases, 62 IND. L.J.
243, 244 (1987).
15. See generally Friedman, ConsitutionalEquality and Affirmative Action In
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rather to examine the recent cases and discover what we can learn
about the current state of the law. We are in an area where the
Court engages in ad hoc case-by-case analysis in deciding what is
constitutionally permitted similar to the regulatory taking cases.'
We have not reached what Justice O'Connor has declared: "the diverse formulations and the number of separate writings put forth by
various members of the Court in these difficult cases do not necessarily reflect an intractable fragmentation in opinion with respect to
certain core principles.'1 7 We have established certain principles

that govern these cases.
BACKGROUND DECISIONS

The first affirmative action case, De Funis v. Odegaard,"' involved a law school preferential admissions program for members of
certain ethnic and racial minorities. This action was not aimed at
prior deliberate discrimination by the law school, but rather an attempt to increase the number of minority students. The Court held,
by a five to four vote, that the case was moot with only one of the
dissenters addressing the merits.' 9 Justice Douglas in his dissent
found that a laws school's use of explicit racial classifications violated the equal protection clause.2"
In University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke,2 the
Court struck down a special admissions program of the University of
California at Davis Medical School as invalid.2 2 Four members of
the plurality" did not reach constitutional issues, but found that
this program was forbidden by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1967, while the other five members did address the question of constitutionality. The opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun found that the special admissions program did not
violate the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution nor did it violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Powell, the
swing vote writing for himself but announcing the judgment of the
Court, held that the racial classification could be constitutional but
Employment: A Search for Standards, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1113 (1986).
16. The last major breakthrough in the regulatory taking area occurred in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), where the Court held that if regulatory taking goes too far then it will violate the Constitution. See generally Lee,
Missing Pieces: A Commentary on Choper, 72 IOWA L. REV. 275, 278 (1987).
17. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
19. Id. at 317.
20. Id. at 341-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id. at 325-26. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and
Stevens were the four members of the court not reaching constitutional issues.
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was not in this case. The Court held that race could be a factor or a
plus in the admissions process in order to achieve diversity in the
student body.24
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,2 5 the Court upheld an existing collective bargaining agreement which provided for
a craft training program where fifty percent of the spaces were reserved for black workers in the in-plant training program until the
percentage of black craftworkers equaled the percentage of blacks in
the local labor force. Brian Weber, one of the white production
workers, was rejected for the training program because under the
affirmative action program provided in the collective bargaining
agreement, black employees with less seniority than Weber received
training. The Court determined that Title VII was not violated because of the private, voluntary nature of this affirmative action program which did not trammel the interests of any group, and did not
result in any discharges of employees. The Court stressed the temporary nature of the craft program which provided for training for
white as well as black employees. Justice Brennan stated: "We need
not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold
that the challenged .. .plan falls on the permissible side of the

line."26

In Fullilove v. Klutznick,2 7 the Court considered the constitutionality of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. The Act required that ordinarily at least ten percent of the funds be expended
for minority business enterprises (those having at least half ownership by minority members).2 s The court needed two opinions to
form the six justice majority to uphold the statute.29 Chief Justice
Burger wrote an opinion joined by Justices Powell and White stating that Congress may enact legislation containing racial classification if the legislation is narrowly tailored to remedy past effects of
discrimination. Justice Marshall's opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun jointed, repeated the views of Bakke. Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart voted against the classification's
constitutionality. 0 It is clear that the set-aside in Fullilove, was per24. Id. at 311-14.
25. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
26. Id. at 208. Justice Brennan authored the opinion in which Justices White,
Marshall, and Stewart joined with Blackmun concurring in the Court's opinion and
judgment. See generally Belton, Discriminationand Affirmative Action: An Analysis
of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1981).
27. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
28. Id. at 454.
29. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 527, 552-53 (Stevens, J. dissenting); id. at 522-32 (Stewart, J.
dissenting).
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mitted because the amount of business lost by white-dominated
firms was "widely dispersed" and not heavy."1
These cases, Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove, all involved voluntary affirmative plans undertaken by either governmental bodies or
private parties rather than affirmative action imposed by courts in
cases where violations of laws against race discrimination occurred.
The Court in each case also considered the rights of innocent third
parties32 such as those set-aside in Weber which emphasized that
half of the new opportunities in the training program were available
to white workers."3
In Firefighters Local Union Number 1784 v. Stotts,3 ' the Court
held that the district court's order to revise a voluntary affirmative
action plan conflicted with section 703(h) of Title VII" which "permits the routine application of a seniority system absent proof of
any intention to discriminate." Justice White wrote the opinion in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Powell joined. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only and
held the district court had abused its discretion in modifying the
consent decree that settled a law suit against a city fire department
37
that had been sued for race discrimination by black firefighters.
The consent decree had provided affirmative steps to increase the
proportion of minority employees in its fire department. When citywide cutbacks forced layoffs one year later, application of the ordinary seniority system of "last hired-first fired" would have greatly
reduced the ranks of the recently hired black firefighters. The consent decree did not deal with layoffs, but the district court enjoined
the application of the seniority system insofar as it would decrease
the proportional number of blacks in the fire department. The fire
department, obeying the injunction of the court, laid off white
firefighters with more seniority than black firefighters.
The Stotts holding was quite narrowly based in upholding the
concept of seniority 8 and commented that "our ruling in Teamsters
that a court can award competitive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has actually been a victim of illegal discrimination is consistent with the policy behind section 706(g)." 3 9 The
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 484, 515.
See FuUilove, 448 U.S. at 514; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298, 307-08, 310.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
467 U.S. 561 (1984).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. 1986).
Stotts, 467 U.S. at 577.
Id. at 592 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 579-80.
§ 706(g) is the remedial provision of Title VII. "The provisions of [§ 706(g)]

are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to
fashion the most complete relief possible .... [This] section . . . is intended to
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Court rejected, based on Teamsters, the argument that had the
plaintiffs prevailed at trial without a consent decree the court could
have discarded the city's seniority system as justification for the order. The consent decree contained no admission of wrongdoing and
the Court found that the policy behind Title VII was to award
make-whole relief only to actual victims of discrimination. The district court had exceeded its statutory authority under section 706(g)
by awarding constructive seniority to the black firefighters.
Despite the limited application of the Stotts case to general affirmative action, the Department of Justice read the case broadly
and developed a general principle that no racially preferential treatment could ever be given to "nonvictims" of past discrimination.
The Solicitor General's office urged this limited application to affirmative action in subsequent cases. The argument is that only an
identified living victim of discrimination can be made whole and
given a race-based advantage.'
SEARCH FOR STANDARDS

The legality of affirmative action programs depend upon the necessity for affirmative action including findings of past discrimination, the distribution of affirmative action burdens and the consequences to persons who did not discriminate." Where private
employers, such as in Weber,42 institute affirmation action programs,
questions are raised only under Title VII since governmental action
is not involved. However, the constitutionality of affirmative action
arises where a governmental employer adopts such a program or
when a court orders race-based affirmative action. The Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education4a held that the equal protection
clause" prohibited voluntary collective bargained agreements under
which racial classifications were used to determine layoffs from employment. The collective bargained contract between the School
Board of Jackson, Michigan, and the union arose because of racial
tensions in the community and a threatened lawsuit from the
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole . . .and .... so far as possible,
restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination." H.R. Res. 1748, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 188 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972).
40. See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 580. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 27-29, 36 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 467
U.S. 561 (1984) (No. 84-1340).
41. See generally Marris, New Light on Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U. C. DAvis L. REv. 219, 222 (1987).
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text,
43. 476 U.S. 267.
44. "[Nlor shall any State . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. This amendment was
proposed by Congress in 1866 and was ratified in 1868. J. NOWAK,R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 616 (2d ed. 1983).
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NAACP. The contract's preferential affirmative action plan had a
hiring policy goal of "at least the same percentage of minority racial
representation on each individual staff as is represented by the student population ...of the Schools." It also contained a seniority
system for layoffs which contained the following critical language:
"that at no time will there by a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff."' 5 During the 1981 school year
Wendy Wygant and nine other non-minority school teachers were
laid off while minority teachers with less seniority were retained.
Wygant and the others sued in federal court alleging that the affirmative action plan violated the equal protection clause, 6 and Title
VII.17 The plaintiffs lost at both the district court" and court of
appeals."9 The court of appeals held that the Board's interest in providing role models for its students in order to remedy societal discrimination was sufficient to justify racial preferences in the layoff
provisions.5 0 The lower courts held that racial preferences embodied
in the affirmative action plan did not require a finding of discrimination by the Board or a court. The Supreme Court reversed in a
five to four vote without a majority opinion holding that there was a
violation of equal protection. 1 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality,5" rejected both the role model and the goal of remedying societal
discrimination as a sufficient governmental interest to justify racebased affirmation action programs. Powell and the plurality would
require strict scrutiny and noted that "[riacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination." ' 3 The Court ruled that for all racebased affirmative action programs the "level of scrutiny does not
change merely because the challenged classification operates against
a group that historically has not been subject to governmental
4
discrimination."'
45. 476 U.S. 267. Article VII of the Collective Bargain Agreement defined "minority group personnel" as "those employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish descendancy." Id. at n.2.
46. See supra note 44.
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e1-17 (1982).
48. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
49. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 1156.
51. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
52. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in all of Justice Powell's
opinion while Justice O'Connor agreed with the opinion except the part that disapproved of layoffs as an inappropriate means to achieving an important interest. Id. at
293 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 273 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291
(1978)).
54. Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982)).
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Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun have consistently
adhered in these cases to a standard of "near strict scrutiny" where
the remedial racial classification must be substantially related to an
important state interest.5 Justice Stevens, separately dissenting,
used a balancing approach to determine whether a "rational"56 or
"legitimate" 7 public interest was served, and required a further step
to examine "an assessment of the procedures that were used to
adopt and implement the race-conscious action."
The Powell examination was two-pronged. A compelling government interest is the first prong, and, according to Justice Powell,
this requires a showing of prior discrimination by the governmental
unit." Second, "the means chosen by the state to effectuate its purpose must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." 6
This language indicates that a "lawful alternative and less restrictive
means could have been used."6 The Court would require some
showing of prior discrimination and this could be shown by examining and comparing "the racial composition of the teaching staff and
the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market." 2 In addition to not finding evidentiary support of prior discrimination, Justice Powell finds that
the layoff provision is not an appropriate means since it imposes a
much too heavy burden upon the lives of those individuals adversely
affected by layoff plans.6 It is clear that Justice Powell and the
Court may well treat hiring goals quite differently than layoffs: "In
cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society
generally.

...

Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as

'
intrusive as loss of an existing job."64

Since the Court rejected societal discrimination as a basis for a
race-based program, the most important aspect of the case was the
determination that a race-based program was implemented to remedy a prior illegality. A government employer that undertakes a
race-based affirmative action program need not make a finding that
it was responding to its own illegality. The Court stated that "the
trial court must make a factual determination that the employer
55. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519-21 (Marshall, J., concurring).
56. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
57. Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
58. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id. at 279.
61. Id. at 280.
62. Id. at 308.
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. (emphasis in original).
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had a strong [evidentiary basis] for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." 65 The burden is on the challenger to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative action plan.6 6 One
very significant unanswered question is whether a challenger must
show that not only is there no prior illegal conduct, but also, as Justice O'Connor answers, that the governmental agency had no strong
basis for believing that there was no illegal conduct. Justice Powell
does indicate that affirmative action plans could be used if the public employer can show a statistical disparity between the racial composition of its work force and the relevant labor market. 7 All of the
justices are concerned with the burden imposed on innocent persons
by race-based affirmative action. Clearly, the plurality opinion notes
that layoffs are too harsh a burden to impose on innocent people,
even to remedy a prior consitutional violation. 8
While the Supreme Court rejected this particular affirmative action plan, a public employer may undertake an affirmative action
plan that is carefully crafted so as not to overly burden innocent
parties which serves to overcome a violation or potential violation.
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v.EEOC,66 both the district court and court of appeals found
the union's violations of Title VII "egregious." 7 The Supreme Court
approved the district court's ordered goal for the admission of nonwhite workers. The membership goal would impose "only a marginal" burden on the white workers because it affected whites only at
the entry level and did not displace existing workers. The Court ordered Local 28 to increase union membership of blacks and Hispanics to 29% by 1981.
The union, supported by the Solicitor General, urged the Court
to reject the lower courts' orders because they extended race conscious remedies to individuals who were not identified victims of unlawful discrimination. The Court, by a five to four vote, upheld the
right under 706(g) of Title VII 1 and also the broad discretion of
lower courts to award equitable relief to remedy unlawful discrimination. The Court distinguished Wygant from the present case because both lower courts held there were formal findings of prior discrimination. Moreover, the Court did not find a violation of equal
protection because the relief was narrowly tailored. Justice Powell
65. Id. at 277.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 275.
68. Id. at 282.
69. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
70. Id. at 480 (plurality opinion); id. at 485 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000-5(g) (1982).
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concurred in a separate opinion which gave emphasis to the fact
that the goal was limited in duration and was directly related to the
percentage of nonwhites in the relevant work force." Justices
O'Connor and White held the membership goals were impermissible
under Title VII because they operated as racial quotas, not goals.7
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger held that "section
706(g) forbids a court from ordering racial preferences that effectively displaces non-minorities except to minority individuals who
have been the actual victims of a particular employer's racial
'
discrimination. 7
Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland" is a narrow case where the court held limitations
found in section 706(g) of Title VII do not apply to consent decrees.7 6 Justice Brennan noted the voluntary nature of the compliance and that this is the preferred manner of achieving the objective
of Title VII.7 Brennan held that there was no reason that such a
voluntary affirmative action plan should be illegal simply because it
was in a consent decree.
In United States v. Paradises the Court affirmed a district
court's use of a one-black for one-white requirement for promotion
of state troopers to corporals within the Alabama Department of
Public Safety. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion holding
that the district court's order survived a strict scrutiny analysis. The
order served a compelling interest of remedying past and present
discrimination. The Court found the order was sufficiently narrow
because "it is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any other remedy." 9 The Court found that the order was temporary because the
quotas would be abandoned when procedures were available to provide promotion opportunities to minorities. The use of the fifty percent quota to achieve a twenty-five percent minority staff was described as "not itself the goal ... (but) rather ... the speed at which
the goal of 25 percent will be achieved." 80 Justice O'Connor's dissent, which was joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, found the quota system violated the equal protection clause.
The order did not fit "with greater precision than any alternative
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Stevens
77.
78.
79.
80.

Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487 (Powell J. concurring).
Id. at 489 (O'Connor, J. dissenting); id. at 499 (White, J. dissenting).
Id. at 500.
478 U.S. 501 (1986).
Id. at 530 (the majority included Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Powell. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion).
Id. at 521-22.
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 199.
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remedy" ' and did not employ other alternatives that "would have
achieved full compliance with the consent decrees without trammeling on the rights of non-minority troopers."8' One alternative remedy suggested by Justice O'Connor was the appointment of a
trustee.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that there is no clarity in the affirmative action field.
All the justices agree that a race-based remedy may be used to make
the actual victims of prior illegal discrimination whole. It is essential
to determine, under the Powell view of strict scrutiny, a strong basis
that the employer needs to take remedial action. Moreover, the action must not place an undue burden on innocent persons. This is
achieved by temporary, flexible, and narrowly tailored actions.

81.
82.

Id. at 226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.

